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Abstract 
On the eve of the Second Republic there was a broad consensus among most 
contemporaries that some form of land reform was necessary for Spain’s 
southern provinces. Enormous estates were believed to be under-cultivated by 
their absentee owners, denying landless workers employment, and leading to 
widespread rural poverty. The slow implementation of land reform deeply 
divided Spanish society, and is often cited as a cause of the outbreak of the 
Civil War. This paper, using a large sample of farm level information collected 
by the Institute of Agrarian Reform for the estates expropriated in the region of 
Extremadura, questions the possibilities of land reform as a means to raise farm 
output to solve rural poverty. 
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Resumen 
En vísperas de la Segunda República existía un amplio consenso entre la 
mayoría de los contemporáneos de que era necesario algún tipo de reforma 
agraria para las provincias del sur de España. Se creía que las grandes 
propiedades estaban siendo cultivadas de manera demasiado extensiva por 
propietarios generalmente absentistas, negándoles así a numerosos 
trabajadores el acceso al trabajo, lo que llevaría a una extensa pobreza rural. 
La lenta implementación de la reforma agraria dividió profundamente a la 
sociedad española, y se ha considerado como la causa de la Guerra Civil. En 
este trabajo, a través del uso de una amplia muestra de información a nivel de 
explotaciones individuales recogida por el Instituto de Reforma Agraria para las 
propiedades expropiadas en la región de Extremadura, se arguye que los 
intentos de reforma agraria no solo eran un sistema ineficiente para 
incrementar la producción y la productividad, sino que fracasaron en 
proporcionar una solución adecuada a la pobreza rural. 
Palabras clave: reforma agraria, conflicto rural, Extremadura, España, 
Segunda República.  
 
JEL Codes: N54; O13; Q15; R52 
Please do not cite without permission of the authors. 
 
Too many workers or not enough land? 
Why land reform fails in Spain during the 1930s1 
 
James Simpson y Juan Carmona 
 
The failure to carry out a comprehensive land reform and break-up the large estates in 
southern Spain is often cited as a major cause of the outbreak of the Civil War (1936-9). 
Malefakis, for example, wrote that the agrarian problem, given its ‘overwhelming political 
importance’, implies that its study is at ‘the same time an examination of the origins of the 
Spanish Civil War’; while Paul Preston notes that ‘no single area of social or ideological 
confrontation during the 1930s matched in scope or impact the agrarian problem’.2  The failure 
of land reform is usually attributed to a combination of lack of political will on the part of the 
Azaña government (1931-33), the concerted opposition by the Right, and the self-imposed 
budgetary constraints caused by a failure to break with orthodox economic policies.3  
Yet there were other reasons for the failure. López Ontiveros and Mata Olmo, in a study 
of agronomists’ proposals for land reform in the fertile Guadalquivir valley (Campiña) around 
Cordoba, showed that many large estates were already intensely cultivated, especially those 
close to urban settlements, and there were few obvious possibilities to increase output and 
employment in the short-run. As a result, the government’s leading agronomist in the province 
argued that considerably more land had to be expropriated if all the landless were to be settled.4 
Few contemporaries, and perhaps even fewer historians, have accepted these restrictions, and 
even those that questioned the possibilities of settling large numbers on the capital intensive 
farms of the Campiña, believed that there were significant possibilities on the hills and upland 
regions of southern Spain (especially in Extremadura, Western Mancha and Sierra Morena), 
where cultivation was much more extensive.5  This paper looks at land settlements in 
Extremadura where farming in the 1930s was still labour intensive and large areas of pastures 
existed that contemporaries believed could be converted to arable. In addition, and unlike the 
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 Earlier versions of this work were presented at the IV Workshop, Cooperación y conflicto en el mundo 
rural, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2014; EHS Conference, Wolverhampton, 2015; Agricliometrics 
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 Malefakis, 1970, p.6 and Preston, 1984, p. 160. 
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 Some opposition was also found within the government agency for carrying out the land reform (IRA). 
Robledo Hernández, 2014. For budgetary restrictions, see Robledo Hernández, 2010, p. 137-44. By 
contrast, Palafox, 1991, p. 282, argues that the frequent strike action and demands for higher wages 
increased political tensions. Naredo & Molina, 2002, pp.99-100, discuss the contractions of land reform 
to resolve short and long-term problems. 
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 López Ontiveros & Mata Olmo, 1993, pp. 90, 106, and 127. 
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 See for example Candu and de la Puerta who, writing in 1919, clearly distinguished between the 
different possibilities for settling landless in the Campiña and the sierra, in Florencio Puntas, 1994, p. 
320. 
landless workers found on the Campiña, a significant number of the poor were tenants or 
sharecroppers and therefore already accustomed to organizing farm production. The region also 
experienced land invasions in 1932 and 1936, which suggests an active interest in land reform 
that was sometimes missing in Andalucia.6 Despite these apparently favourable conditions, this 
paper argues that land reform failed, just as on the Campiña, because of the lack of suitable land 
to settle sufficient workers. Using farm-level studies carried out by agronomists for the state 
organisation, the Instituto de Reforma Agraria (hereafter IRA), after 1932, it argues that there 
were few possibilities to extend the area under the plough, while the opportunities to intensify 
cultivation were also limited and the extensive rotations practised were usually considered as 
perfectly rational by the agronomists of the day.  In part this was because the agronomists could 
offer few technical possibilities for increasing output, but also because landless workers were 
settled on plots that were too small to support a family and settlers could not use the land as 
collateral. Therefore the positive incentives to good cultivation which are often associated with 
the independent, family farm were absent, and the state was required to assume many of the 
functions that the absentee landowners had previously performed. The result was that land 
reform implied the substitution of one absentee landlord for another. The manner by which land 
reform was implemented therefore created  significant costs, as well as creating tensions 
between the often contradictory political demands to resolve the problems of low productivity 
and poverty with those of a long-term need to increase output, problems which were unlikely to 
have been resolved even if the Civil War had not halted its progress.  
This paper has four sections. The first considers briefly the economic logic behind a 
land reform, and examines the Spanish experience in the 1930s. This is followed by a study of 
land availability and the numbers that needed to be settled. The state had poor information on 
both, but a truly massive redistribution of property would have been necessary if workers were 
to be given sufficient land to cover basic subsistence. Section three examines the 
implementation of land reform in the province of Badajoz in the Extremadura region, and shows 
that there were limited possibilities to increase output by intensifying cultivation. Finally, 
section four argues that the failure to give each family sufficient land resulted in the 
underemployment of labour, work animals and farm machinery, changing the nature of 
transaction costs associated with using labour, rather than reducing them. The last section 
concludes.   
 
 
 
 
                                               
6
 For the reluctance of the anarchist landless workers to be settled in Jerez de la Frontera, Caro Cancela, 
2001, pp. 196-208. 
1. Why land reform? Poverty and property ownership in southern Spain  
The agronomist Pascual Carrión in 1919 advanced ideas for a land reform which echo some 
of those used by institutional economists today.7 Farm work, unlike industrial work he argued, 
was highly diverse, and it was difficult to create an incentive structure for wage workers to carry 
out the tasks quickly and with the necessary care. By contrast, owner-occupiers or tenant 
farmers enjoyed strong incentives, and were willing to work long hours to maximise their 
output. This situation was especially true in southern Spain, where labour militancy and union 
activity increased costs further, as one Socialist noted in 1925: 
In order to give his comrades a chance, the labourer begins late, works slowly, and tries to 
make his rests as frequent and long as the vigilance of the ganger will allow; as a result 
output falls. As he so often says, “What are we to do? If we work hard, there will be too 
many of us by half”.8 
 
Therefore land reform, by creating small family farms, promised greater work opportunities 
and allowed farmers to use their entrepreneurial abilities to boost output per hectare and worker, 
even though hourly productivity was inevitably lower. The fact that large farmers faced much 
lower costs to access capital markets was less important because of the limited use of physical 
capital in traditional agriculture.9 Economic theory suggests therefore that the break-up of large 
estate into small family farms would lead to an increase in output, improve income distribution, 
and raise efficiency.   
The level of land concentration in southern Spain in the 1930s was significant, but not as 
great as had been in earlier periods, or in some parts of Eastern Europe at this time.10 Malefakis, 
using the partly complete cadastre of the period, estimates that farms of over 250 hectares 
numbered just 0.3 per cent of the total, but accounted for 41.2 per cent of the total area and 27.8 
per cent of the taxable income.11 Some of the highest land concentration was found on the rich 
cereal lands of the Guadalquivir valley (Campiña), as well as the huge dehesas farms in the less 
populated hills and upland areas. Carrión argued that these latifundios had created ‘low 
population densities; under-cultivation; low wages; high rents; few and rickety livestock and, in 
general, a precarious situation over a third of the country’.12  From the turn of the twentieth 
century, a growing number of urban intellectuals argued that by expropriating and giving the 
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 Carrión, in El Sol, 15 de junio, 1919. 
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 De los Rios, 1925, p. 844. 
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 As Lipton argues, the inverse relationship between farm size and average annual output per hectare is 
more important in low income economies than the ‘positive relationship between farm size and average 
output per hour of work’ found on large estates Lipton, 2009, p.6. 
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 For size of latifundios, see Bernal, 1979, Bernal, 1988, López Ontiveros & Mata Olmo, 1993 and 
Carmona, Roses, & Simpson, 2015. In Eastern Europe, see Dovring, 1965, 239-57.  
11
 Malefakis, 1970, Table 3. 
12
 Carrión 1932: 1975, p. 347. Limited evidence is actually provided as shown below.  
land to those who actually worked it, would increase output, alleviate rural poverty, and 
stimulate economic growth and the modernization of Spanish society.13  
Spain on the eve of the Republic was in the process of rapid structural change, as 
agriculture’s share of the total labour force fell from around 65 per cent in 1910 to 50 per cent 
or less by 1930, and labour productivity increased by 56 per cent and output per hectare by 20 
per cent over the same period.14 However labour was slower to leave agriculture in the south 
and, cyclical unemployment appears to have increased significantly after 1931. Following the 
free elections in 1931, there was a massive shift in political power away from landowners to 
landless labourers and small farmers, which raised the demands for land reform. After passing 
laws which changed fundamentally how rural labour and rental markets operated, the 
government turned to land reform itself.15 
The Land Reform law of September 1932 promised much, with the Socialists talking of 
settling 100-150,000 peasants each year, although even the government’s more modest goal of 
60-75,000 settlers in November 1931 had been dropped by the time it was finally passed.16 By 
December 1933, ‘two and one-half years after the proclamation of the Republic, only 45,000 
hectares had changed hands to the benefit of just 6000 or 7000 peasants’. In countries where 
land reforms have been successful, the state has often owned large areas of uncultivated lands 
that could be settled, or been able to confiscate properties without compensation from 
landowners who had been politically discredited or shown to have acquired their properties 
illegally.17 In Spain there was very little empty land that could be brought into cultivation. 
Instead, the government linked the grandees to the failed ‘Sanjurjo’ military coup in 1932 and 
used this as an excuse to expropriate their lands without compensation. However this traditional 
nobility, rather than owning ‘half of Andalusia’ as many initially believed, turned out to possess 
a much more modest 1.2 or 1.3 million hectares throughout the country, or ‘no more than 6 per 
cent of the 21 million hectares that are normally cultivated’.18 In addition, the agronomists 
quickly found that the grandees’ estates offered limited opportunities to increase the area 
cultivated and create employment. Attempts to expropriate other estates, even with 
compensation, failed, and the electoral victory of the centre-right led to a new, very restrictive 
reform bill in 1935.  
The situation change dramatically following the Popular Front’s electoral victory in 
February 1936. The Socialist rural syndicate (FNTT) authorized its Badajoz Federation to 
launch a massive invasion on 25 March, with 60,000 or more than half the adult male rural 
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 For a recent survey, González de Molina, 2014, pp. 23-59. 
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 Griffin, Rahman Khan, & Ickowitz, 2002.   
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 Malefakis 1970, p. 73.  
population, occupying 3000 previously selected farms and in ‘ a single decisive act the peasants 
had occupied far more land than had been granted to them in the previous five years’.19 The new 
government responded by settling around 712,070 hectares between 16 February and 17 July 
1936, with 219,128 hectares being found in Extremadura.20  The state also looked to find other 
property to redistribute, and on the eve of the Civil War the Cortes was beginning the 
proceedings to recover old common lands, many of which were believed to have been illegally 
sold over the long nineteenth century.21  
 
2. Too many workers or not enough land? 
Contemporaries in 1931 lacked detailed information on both the numbers that needed to be 
settled and the potential area of land that was available. This was not an accident, but rather the 
combination of a disinterested state which until the late 1920s lacked the administrative 
organisation to collect basic information on land ownership and employment statistics, and 
strong local politicians (caciques) who had often successfully challenged the intrusion of central 
government in what they believed to be their areas of influence.22 
The publication of Pascual Carrión’s highly influential book in 1932 provided statistical 
information from the cadastre, which by this date was complete for eight of the 14 latifundio 
provinces (‘southern Spain’), and well advanced in the remaining five.23 For southern Spain, 
Carrión calculated that some 5.9 million hectares were needed to settle 930,000 families (Table 
1).24  Carrión believed that 10.4 million hectares could be made available by expropriating all 
the land found on estates of over 250 hectares, and assumed that half could be cultivated.25 In 
fact Carrión greatly exaggerated both the numbers of families requiring land, and the 
availability of land that could be cultivated. 
To implement the Land Reform Act in September 1932, the central government required the 
land registries to provide information for the land that could be expropriated, a figure that 
reached 4.65 million hectares.26 It also instructed each village to create a census (Censo de 
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 Malefakis, 1970, p.370. 
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 Boletín del Instituto de Reforma Agraria (hereafter, BIRA), September 1936, p.357. For a discussion 
on the figures, see also (Malefakis, 1970), pp. 377-378. 
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 See Beltrán-Tapia, Iriarte-Goñi, & Lana-Berasain, 2014. 
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 For a general background on the question of state capacity, see especially, Scott, 1998 and Besley & 
Persson, 2011, and for Spain, Simpson & Carmona, in preparation, chapter 4. 
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 It was virtually complete in Albacete, Cadiz, Ciudad Real, Cordoba, Granada, Jaen, Malaga and 
Toledo, and 94% complete in Seville, 83% in Badajoz, 73% in Huelva, 67% in Almeria, 59% in Caceres, 
and 51% in Salamanca. Carrión, 1932: 1975, cuadro 3. 
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 Carrión, 1932: 1975, p. 362. According to this study, 250,000 landless families required 10 hectares 
each, and a further 680,000 families with insufficient land required five hectares each.  
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 Carrrión, 1932: 1975, cuadro 65. 
26
 Robledo Hernández, 2010, p. 126. Carrion’s figures included all the land on the large estates, while the 
1932 Land Reform allowed owners to keep a part. There were thirteen different categories under which 
land could be expropriated, and the same piece of land could be liable for expropriation for a variety of 
reasons. See Malefakis, 1970, chapter 8. 
campesinos) of the poor landless workers, small owners and tenants.27 In addition to the 
difficulties of deciding exactly which workers should be helped, there were widespread 
complaints of abuse in compiling the Censo and many villages across the country failed to carry 
it out.28 Despite these short-comings, the Censo de campesinos gives the best indicator of the 
numbers of landless and poor, and was probably the source used by Vazquez Humasqué, the 
director of the government’s Instituto de Reforma Agraria (IRA), in his estimate of 407,000 
families in 1934.29 
 
Table 1. Estimates of available land and peasants to be settled in southern Spain and Badajoz  
  Total land 
area 
available 
Estimated 
families to 
be settled 
Hectares 
per family 
Estimated 
net output 
per hectare 
Output per 
family 
Hectares 
required for 
2000 pesetas 
SOUTHERN SPAIN 
Carrion (1932) 5,900,000 930   6.3 250 2500 8 
Vazquez 
Humasqué(34) 
3,660,000 407   9.0 67 600 30 
Robledo (2015) 4,650,000 407 11.4    
       
BADAJOZ   
Vazquez 
Humasqué(34) 
399 57 7 86 600 23 
Simpson (1995b) 1,602,000*   171 gross  11.7 
Badajoz (20 farms)** 17,082 2,18   7.8 102.5 803 19.5 
* Refers to the whole province in 1931; ** IRA plans for future settlements (see below) 
Sources: Carrión, 1932: 1975; El Sol 17 de mayo 1934; Robledo Hernández, 2014; Simpson, 
1995b and AIRA, various cajas. 
 
Despite the fact that Vazquez Humasqué and Carrión projected transfers of between 32 and 
52 per cent of all farm land in southern Spain, there was still insufficient to allow families to be 
financially independent even by their calculations (Table 1).30 Carrión believed an average of 10 
hectares was needed, and both authors recognized the necessity for families to supplement their 
incomes working elsewhere. Vazquez Humasqué argued that in the short-term income could be 
transferred from owners to settlers, but hoped that in the long run revenues would increase from 
an intensification of dry-farming. This, he argues, also depended on external factors, such as the 
development of new crops and techniques, as well as the possibilities of finding markets and 
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 Farmers working their own land were eligible if they paid less than 50 pesetas tax, equivalent to about 
10 hectares of cereal land. Malefakis 1970, pp.111-2 and Espinoza, Robledo, Brel, & Villar, 2007, p. 310. 
28
 For peasant lists, Espinoza et al., 2007 and Corrionero Salinero, 1986. There were strong incentives for 
local authorities, whether of the Left or Right, to create lists which rewarded their political followers.  
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 Vazquez Humasqué, El Sol, 17 de mayo 1934. A recent estimate gives 570,000 landless adult male 
workers, a figure which perhaps is not too different to the 407,000 families. Carmona et al., 2015. 
30
 The total physical area of the 14 provinces was 18.3 million hectares, of which 11.28 can be considered 
as farm land in 1931. Simpson, 1995b. 
remunerative prices for labour intensive crops such as maize, cotton and melons. Interestingly, 
Vazquez Humasqué makes no mention of the possibility of planting olive trees or vineyards, 
reflecting the difficulties facing these labour intensive crops in the 1930s.31 
Yet in theory at least, sufficient land was available in southern Spain to settle most, if not all 
farm workers, and provide them with a subsistence income. If all the land that produced a 
taxable income of over 5,000 pesetas was redistributed to those employed in agriculture and 
who earned less than this figure, then the average net income per family of this group would 
increase in southern Spain from 1,922 to 2,221 pesetas (see Appendix 1 for details). In other 
words, confiscating the land from fewer than 13,871 owners, equivalent to 2.7 per cent of the 
total farm population, and distributing it to the landless and near landless could in theory have 
increased their average annual incomes by 16 per cent.32 Agronomists at this time estimated the 
needs of a family farm at 5-6,000 pesetas gross a year which, deducting rent, interest on capital, 
and taxes (but not labour), left a net income of between 2 and 3,000 pesetas.33 As land reform 
did not contemplate a transfer of ownership from landowner to the state, rent was required to be 
paid by the settlers. 
Huge amounts of land were needed to be transferred if all families were going to have 
sufficient to produce even a subsistence income, and many would still have been totally 
dependent on the state for working capital.34 Even ignoring the fierce political opposition from 
landowners, a land reform of this calibre was not feasible in any country, but especially not in 
one that struggled to even measure the potential area of land available for redistribution, or the 
numbers that needed to be settled. The Spanish state lacked administrative capacity, with only 
60 agronomists for the whole country as late as 1933.35 Spreading reform over a period of 
several decades was theoretically possible, but seriously risked that the agenda for settlement 
would be set by those groups which faced the lowest costs to organize, rather than what the 
government or technicians considered necessary. Indeed, there is a close correlation between the 
areas in southern Spain which experienced land invasions in 1932 and 1936, and those where 
workers were settled in greatest numbers.36 It also helps explain why both Socialist and 
Anarchist syndicates demanded that the criteria for settling the land be left to their local 
workers’ associations and not the state technicians. Given the lack of unused land that the 
government could distribute, the fatal combination of a weak state capacity; strong legal 
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 This figure is an upper bound, as the income and wages earned by workers and small farmers who 
rented plots of land from farm owners earning a taxable income of more than 5,000 pesetas a year is 
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 Carrión 1932: 1975, p. 342 (p.392). As cereals produced 500 and 600 pesetas gross per hectare, or 300 
pesetas net, implying farms needed to be 10 hectares. 
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 For Badajoz, see below. 
35
 There were also 15 forestry experts, 7 vets and a number of other assistants. Macarro Vera, 2000, 
p.220. For a more optimistic view, Pan-Montojo, 2005.  
36
 Carmona & Simpson, 2015b. 
resistance by landowners; and the legitimate demands of rural syndicates to improve members’ 
living standards, made land reform impossible in a democratic society such as found in Spain in 
the 1930s.37 
 
3. The dehesa economy and possibilities for increasing output 
Some believed that even if there was insufficient land to settle all the landless, land reform 
would change farmers’ incentives and lead to an increase in output, especially as under-
cultivation was believed to be common.38 Land reform was attempted on two very different 
types of latifundios, namely the large cereal farms (cortijos), found especially in the fertile 
Guadalquivir river basin (Campiña), and on the dehesas, lands of poorer quality soils in upland 
areas of Andalucía and throughout Extremadura (Badajoz and Caceres). 39  Land reform on the 
cortijos required asset-poor landless workers to become entrepreneurs, but on the dehesas many 
already owned draft animals and farm equipment and were experienced at organizing 
themselves in small groups to rent land to cultivate.40 Furthermore, and unlike the Campiña in 
Andalucía, there were no significant technological and capital barriers to intensification on the 
dehesas,41 a fact that helps explain why they experienced most of Spain’s land invasion before 
the Civil War. The rest of this paper looks at detail at the experience of land reform on the 
dehesas in the province of Badajoz where 34 per cent of land was found in farms of more than 
250 hectares, and output per hectare was 171 pesetas, or 52 per cent the national average.42  A 
total of 30 settlements were created under the 1932 Land Reform Act, which ranged in size 
from 1.8 to 2,855 hectares.43 The fact that all these settlements had previously belonged to 
grandees presents an obvious bias in our study, but it was precisely on the land of this group of 
absentee landowners that contemporaries believed offered the best opportunities to improve 
cultivation.  
 The large dehesas, despite the extensive nature of cultivation and low livestock 
densities, were complex economic organizations. The seasonal nature of the region’s rainfall 
implied that there were abundant pastures from the autumn to the spring, but relatively little 
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 For democracy and the capacity for collective action among landowners, see Albertus, Brambor, & 
Ceneviva, 2014. 
38
 Carrión, 1932: 1975, pp. 336-37 and 392, believed that average output per hectare in dry farming 
regions could triple from 200 to 600 pesetas per hectare.  
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 For example, Juan Lara in April 1936, the government’s agronomist for Cordoba, argued for future 
settlements in the province to be on the dehesas and Campiña, and planed none in the olive growing 
regions where family operations were already the norm. AIRA, Córdoba 14, 0-1. 
40
 Land reforms that provide land to the tiller rather than landless labourers have historically tended to be 
more successful. See, for example, Griffin et al., 2002. 
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 In particular, there was a need to plough at a greater depth on the heavy, fertile soils. Sumpsi, 1978. 
42
 Carrión, 1932:75 cuadro 3, and Simpson, 1994, p.212. Only Albacete (165 pesetas), Caceres (141), 
Huesca (163) and Teruel (114) had lower figures. 
43
 Numbers are imprecise because land reform in some cases joined neighbouring estates, and divided 
others (see Appendix 2). Another three communities, Montelobo, Mariana, and Nava, had existed since 
1924; AIRA, Caja 6.7, Monografías.  
during the long summer months. This created significant fluctuations in the number of animals 
that could be kept during the year, and landowners often rented the whole dehesa to large 
livestock owners from outside the province, who removed their animals to more northerly 
provinces during the summer months, just as the members of the Mesta had done previously for 
centuries.44 These large tenants in turn sublet or sharecropped part of the land to local villagers 
to plant cereals and legumes.45 Leases were for only two or three years, and livestock owners 
benefited from both the rent and the fact that cultivation improved pasture quality.46 The sub-
tenants and sharecroppers had few legal rights, but they usually could expect to receive a new 
plot elsewhere on the dehesa when their contracts expired. Finally, tree crops were important, 
not just for wood and charcoal, but holm oaks that provided fodder for pigs in the autumn, and 
the region was one of Europe’s leading cork producers.47 The diversity of the dehesa can be 
seen from the agronomists’ plans to settle six estates in the 1930s; and cereals and legumes 
contributed half or less of the total product of the dehesa in two cases (Table 2).    
 
Table 2.  Estimates for future income on six settlements in Badajoz (in %).  
  
arable livestock tree crops total 
Año y vez without pastures     
Las Cabras 82,7 10,1 7,2 100 
Merinillas 96,1 3,9 0,0 100 
     
Dehesas with pastures     
Margaritas 50,8 34,6 14,6 100 
Pulgosa, La  35,2 49,5 15,4 100 
Tablado y Capilla  77,1 22,0 1,0 100 
Zarzoso, El  45,0 47,6 7,4 100 
     
average  settlements % 68,0 25,4 6,6 100 
Sources: Archivo del Instituto de Reforma Agraria: La Pulgosa, CAJA 6.37; 
Merinilla Altas, CAJA 6.XX; Las Cabras, CAJA 6.24; Las Margaritas, CAJA 6.9; 
Zarzoso, CAJA 6.42. 
 
 
 The intensity of cultivation depended on soil fertility, farm-gate prices, and the distance 
that workers had to travel from their villages to reach the fields. In the province of Badajoz 
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 The Jurados Mixtos de la Propiedad de Cáceres specifically name the provinces of León, Avila and 
Segovia.  
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 Carmona & Simpson, 2014a and Riesco Roche, 2006.  
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 Balabanian, 1980 and Campos Palacín, 1983. 
47
 The charcoal industry employed between 15 and 20,000 families part-time, essentially for the national 
market, but output had dropped significantly from the First World War. Rosique Navarro, 1988, pp.57 
and 70.  
between 1910 and 1930, the growing use of artificial fertilizers and high cereal prices led to the 
area of cereals and legumes increasing 68 per cent, from 258 to 434,000 hectares, although it is 
impossible to determine to what extent this took place on the dehesas as oppose to the richer 
soils of the interior such as the Tierra de Barros.48 There is, however, some evidence to suggest 
that high wheat prices had led to rotations being dangerously shortened on the dehesas even 
before the Second Republic.49 At the same time, the total live weight of animals increased by 60 
per cent between 1905/10 and 1929/33, increasing demand for pasture and fodder.50 
 Population density in Badajoz was just 32.3 per square kilometre, even including the 
provincial capital. Agriculture employment was highly seasonal, so most workers lived in large 
villages to be close to information concerning work opportunities in both the formal and 
informal sectors.51 For the 28 settlements for which information is available, only three were 
found within a kilometre of the nearest village, but 17 (or 61 per cent of the total) were five 
kilometres or more, discouraging intensive cultivation. In 1932 the state had virtually no 
information on either how farms were actually being cultivated, or their potential to increase 
output without leading to soil mining. Carrión surprising gives only one example of a 
supposedly poorly cultivated farm in his book, a dehesa in Trujillo in Caceres. On this 444 
hectare farm, 20 per cent of the land was under permanent pasture, 40 per cent lay in unsown 
fallow, 20 per cent ploughed fallow, and just 20 per cent sown with wheat, barley, and oats. 
Yields and livestock densities were low, and gross output was just 116 pesetas per hectare, or 37 
pesetas net. Carrion argued that these figures were similar ‘over much of Badajoz’, and argued 
that there was significant potential for increasing output and employment through a shortening 
of the fallow (Table 3).52 However, he offers virtually no information concerning ecological 
restrictions, farm gate prices, or the practical problems associated with settling large numbers of 
workers at a significant distance from their homes.53 
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 Zapata, 1986, pp. 1413-1416.  
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 Carmona & Simpson, 2015b.  
50
 Zapata, 1986, Table 3.12.  
51
  Wheat cultivation required just 16.2 days’ work per hectare on the dehesas, and the preparation of the 
fallow a further seven days. Instituto de Reforma Agraria, 1934, p.89. 
52
 Carrión, 1932: 75, pp. 328-32 (1932: 348-509). Arable accounted for 78 per cent of income. A second 
dehesa is also described, but it raised only sheep, goats and pigs 
53
 Vazquez Humasqué believed in 1931 that all workers, ‘every one of them’, were able to run a farm and 
therefore the agrarian problem could be solved by dividing the estates and giving labourers work tools.  
Cited in Robledo Hernández, 2007, p. 107.  
Table 3. Output and input in cereal and legume production in Andalusia and Extremadura (in 
pesetas)54 
    INPUTS  (except labour)     
  OUTPUT seeds and fertilizers 
work 
animals 
interest, 
insurance 
total 
inputs 
% 
inputs/ 
ouput 
Ricardian 
rent labour 
         
Cereal año y vez 350 60 50 20 130 37% 120 100 
Al tercio 225 35 30 15 80 36% 75 70 
Al cuarto 160 25 20 12 57 36% 53 50 
Al quinto 98 20 15 8 43 44% 20 35 
Trujillo farm 116 20 25 4.5 49.5 43% 17 29.2 
         
BADAJOZ (1) 156 NA NA NA NA NA 38 NA 
Sources: Based on cadastral records, in Carrión, 1932:75, p.324. 
(1) Badajoz, only cereals and cereals area. GEHR, 1983a and Simpson, 1995b.  
  
Following the 1932 Land Reform Act, agronomists began to draw up plans for new 
settlements (planes de asentamiento) on the confiscated estates, which contained information on 
how the farms were currently being run; proposals for future improvements; and a simple 
accounting exercise to show projected future income.55 For the 20 proposals that can be used for 
Badajoz, seven corresponded to estates that planned año y vez (where half the land was planted 
with cereals, and the other half left fallow); another seven with cereals planted once every three 
years (al tercio); and with cultivation even more extensive on the remaining six. Interestingly, 
the agronomists proposed very few changes in the rotations, and about half their reports 
contained no suggestions for improvements at all. Their criticism in general was limited to the 
insufficient use of fertilizers (but in only two cases); the presence of grama grass suggesting 
poor cultivation (again, two cases); the planting oats on the stubble (four cases); 56 or the lack of 
legumes being sown in the fallow, even though this was already being done on 13 out of the 20 
farms. 57 They made no proposals to plant new crops such as maize or cotton or increase the 
livestock density.58 The overall picture from these twenty farms is that agronomists believed 
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 The Cadastral rent was a fiscal estimate, essentially equivalent to the Ricardian rent, and did not 
necessarily match the market rent. 
55
 Information was required to determine the number of workers who could be settled, as well as the 
compensation that had to be paid to the previous owners for the standing crops, work animals, and farm 
instruments. The planes de asentamiento were perhaps the first attempt by a Spanish government to 
systematically collect farm level information. For a description, see López Ontiveros & Mata Olmo, 
1993, ch.5. 
56
 This, the resiembra or relva, was highly criticised by agronomists despite the use of chemical 
fertilizers. 
57
 By contrast, on a farm in Trujillo, very close to Carrión’s example, the IRA’s agronomist proposed to 
reduce the intensity of planting from once every three to once every four years, as the soil was becoming 
exhausted and only keep one sheep per hectare. AIRA, Caja 10.0.01.  
58
 The agronomist noted for the Señorio y Taldarroba estate that the introduction of cotton or maize 
would require constant supervision by technicians and was impractical in the short-run given their current 
workloads. AIRA, Caja, 6.37, p. vii. 
that only minimal changes could be introduced, at least in the short term. One possible 
explanation for this pessimism is that the agronomists were often making plans for farms that 
had already seen an increase in the area cultivated following the 1932 Intensificación de cultivos 
decree which, by March 1933 in Badajoz, had seen 53,146 hectares, equivalent to a tenth of the 
total area sown, given to workers to cultivate for two years in small.59 However, according to 
Vazquez Humasqué, this land simply compensated that which landowners had failed to 
cultivate, and total output remained unchanged.60  
 
 
Table 4.  Production proposals by agronomists for 20 settlements in Badajoz. Pesetas per 
hectare  
        INPUT   
 settlements wheat 
yields 
(1) 
OUTPUT 
(2) 
seeds and 
fertilizers 
working 
animals 
interest, 
insurance 
total 
inputs 
% 
inputs/ 
output 
cadastral 
rent 
Cereal año y vez 7 13.4 412 62 51 22 134 33% 43.6 
al tercio 7 11.8 216 31 33 10 74 35% 40 
al cuarto 3 10.0 168 23 23 8 55 33% 37 
al quinto y con pastos 3 7.3 122 13 14 4 30 25% 34 
          
Average 20 settlements 20 11.4 263 38.0 35.0 13.0 85.0 32% 40.0 
 
 
        
BADAJOZ PROVINCE 
  
7.8 156 NA NA NA NA NA 38.0 
(1) in quintals per hectare; (2) refers to cereals and legumes  
(2) Sources: AIRA various cajas  
 
 
Yet although agronomists recommended few changes, and overall projected wheat 
yields that would be 46 per cent higher and output per hectare 76 per cent greater than the 
provincial average after reform. However, according to the cadastral, average land quality was 
only five per cent better than the provincial average (Table 4). On the ‘best’ seven estates, 
agronomists appear to have been too optimistic, planning cereal output of over 400 pesetas per 
hectare on land that, according to the cadastral was of only of fourth or fifth quality.61  In 
conclusion, the agronomists predicted high levels of output with minimum production changes 
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 BIRA, October 1933, pp. 52-60, Malefakis, 1970, pp. 236-43 and (GEHR, 1983b), p. 308. Workers 
were given on average a fifth of the farm area. Malefakis, 1970, p.281, notes that ‘the only real 
accomplishment of the Azaña regime in land redistribution was the Intensification of Cultivation decrees. 
But although these settled some forty thousand peasants, and significantly transformed agricultural life in 
Badajoz and Caceres, they were only temporary measures. The yunteros were given use of the land only 
until the harvest of 1934.’ 
60
 BIRA, March 1933, p. 261. 
61
 Cereal production producing 350 pesetas per hectare per year corresponded to a cadastral rent of 120 
pesetas, while the figure for the settlements on which agronomists planned a production of over 400 
pesetas had cadastral rents of between 25 pesetas (Represa) and 82 pesetas per hectare (Fuente Omendo). 
Fuente Omendo, for example, was a farm of 300 hectares that was projected to produce 600 pesetas per 
hectare under dry farming, despite producing only traditional products such wheat, barley, rye and 
legumes. Livestock products are excluded. 
on relatively poor soils. The source of error is not easy to identify. One possibility is that the 
agronomists believed that greater labour inputs following reform would lead to higher yields, a 
possibility that is considered below. Another is that the cadastral contains errors. There is no 
evidence that this is the case, although the continued strength of vertical clientelistic networks 
perhaps should not rule out this possibility for some farms.62   
A final possibility is that agronomists simply extrapolated the yields found on the best 
lands to those poorer soils of the farm. For example, the agronomist proposed año y vez 
rotations for the Castillo de Guadajira estate, but sufficiently fertile soils were found on only a 
sixth of the farm.63 On the 596 hectare Merinillas estate, año y vez was already practiced (wheat 
or barley, followed by chickpeas and beans) before expropriation, but the agronomist now 
proposed eliminating the barley (despite yields of 1.8 tonnes per hectare), and extend the 
rotation to the 120 hectares of pasture by increasing the use of superphosphates to 300 kilos per 
hectare.64 Production in the first year was very mediocre, with wheat yields of only 0.75 tonnes 
against an expected 1.75 to 2.20 tonnes.65   
It is clear that that the extensive cultivation techniques found in Badajoz in the early 
1930s were more a consequence of natural resource endowments and farm prices, than supposed 
inefficiencies caused by absentee landowners. However, the optimism of IRA’s agronomists 
could perhaps be explained if the new settlements, by increasing significantly the amount of 
labour, could compensate in some way for the poor quality soils. In fact, as we shall consider 
now, work incentives remained poor and there is no evidence that significantly higher yields 
were possible.  
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 Major changes in farm prices cannot be the cause as the cadastral in Badajoz was carried out after the 
First World War.  
63
 The cadastral figure for the farm (36 pesetas per hectare) was the average of very different soil 
qualities: on the best (in reality only second class) the figure was 63 pesetas per hectare and represented 
17 per cent of the total estate; 40 per cent were third and fourth class (between 40 and 48 pesetas); and 30 
per cent between fifth and seventh (16-30 pesetas), which explains why before being expropriated only a 
third of the fallow was sown.    
64
 This pasture had been previously given to 122 senareros to cultivate. AIRA, Caja 6.59, pp. ii-iv. 
65
  In Badajoz, wheat yields fell from 1.3 to 7.8 tonnes or 40 per cent between 1934 and 1935. (GEHR, 
1991), pp. 226 and 230). 
Table 5.  Statistical description of the 30 Badajoz Settlements (1934-1936).  
  
    settlements (4)     
  
30 
settlements 
Province of 
Badajoz 
(1930) minimum maximum average median 
area in hectares 17082 2.164.672 1,8 2.855 632 437 
    permanent pasture and forest 1882  0 305 70 33 
    % total 11%  0% 60% 14% 7% 
       
total ouput * (in pesetas) (1)  3.472.600 274.270.000 750 460.000 128.600 75.610 
    per hectare * 203,3 127 92 497 234 174 
    livestock  and cork share of total output * 8% 35% 0% 66% 18% 15% 
    output net of inputs (except labor)  and rent * 1.751.200 191.270.000 8.000 193.500 63.850 33.500 
          per hectare 102,5 88,4 44 347 120,4 91,8 
       
Net income (cadastral assesment)  (2) 730.280 83.000.000 267 120.000 27.047 19.100 
      per hectare 42,8 38,3 31,3 256,3 49 41 
       
SETTLERS       
number of settlers/families (3) 2.180 105.337 2 560 81 32 
hectares per settler 7,8 20,5 0,9 44,1 13,9 12,8 
output per settler (net of inputs but with rents) * 1.593 2.604 195 3.512 1.827 1.714 
output per settler excluded rents * 803 1.816 145 3.029 1.315 1.212 
hectares needed per settler to get a net income 
of 2,000 pesetas * 19,5  5,7 45,5 26,5 21,8 
hectares needed per settler to get a net income 
of 1,300 pesetas * 12,7   3,7 29,5 17,2 14,2 
(1) net of seeds       
(2) Badajoz adjusted.        
(3) Badajoz figures in Carrión (1932, )       
(4) minimum, maximum, average and median within the 30/22 (when indicated) settlements figures   
Sources: AIRA, 22 cajas.  
 
 
 
Map 1. Settlements location.  
4. The experience of land reform in Badajoz  
Successful land reforms, such as undertaken in Japan or Taiwan following the Second 
World War, led to tenants receiving full property rights to the land, thereby increasing both their 
ability to access credit markets and providing incentives to cultivate it more efficiently.66  This 
did not happen in Spain. Instead, landless workers became tenants of the IRA, and consequently 
were unable to sell or mortgage the land. Despite this problem, the fact that workers were 
guaranteed continuous access to the land might still have led to greater output. However, to 
succeed, three major problems traditionally associated with community arrangements needed to 
be resolved: the threat of exit by high-ability members; adverse selection (the attraction of low-
ability members); and shirking.67 The evidence suggests that these problems were significant in 
Badajoz, and the IRA was required to intervene extensively for settlements to remain viable.  
A major decision facing the government was the number of families to settle on each 
farm. Manuel Azaña, the President of the Republic, rejected a carefully prepared proposal by 
the Ministry of Agriculture to provide land and a government loan of 12,000 pesetas apiece, 
equivalent to a subsistence income for six years, to 4,000 families.68 The same fate met the plan 
to settle 23 workers, each with their own plough team and producing a gross income of 7,600 
pesetas per family, on the 596 hectare Merinillas Altas estate in Badajoz. Projects that converted 
a relatively small number of asset-poor labourers into prosperous family farmers would fail to 
solve the severe regional unemployment, and therefore considered politically unacceptable. 
Instead, land was assigned to cover a family’s basic needs, rather than reducing their 
dependence on labour markets for seasonal employment. On Merinillas Altas, 119 instead of 23 
families were settled, each with five hectares producing an estimated net income of 1,467 
pesetas (2,346 pesetas gross). 
In a few cases the problems of selecting suitable individuals and creating new 
organizations to coordinate large numbers of workers were reduced by delegating to existing 
independent associations.69 In Zahinos, the local syndicate El Progress claimed to have 
cultivated Las Cabras since 1908, and was allowed to continue. 70 Likewise in Higuera de 
Vargas, where all the villagers belonged to the La Benéfica association and 560, or a quarter of 
its membership, were permitted to stay on Ramira Alta which they had rented since 1928, each 
with less than two hectares.71 In Torremejía, two distinct associations in May 1936 were 
authorized to cultivate Señorío y Torralba: the socialist syndicate with 180 members were given 
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 Griffin et al., 2002, p.303. 
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 Abramitzky, 2011. 
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 6th July 1933, in Azaña, 1997, p.383. He complained that loans were for everything, from a pair of 
mules to two water jars for each settler. The farm was probably in Andalusia.  
69
 Article 12c of the 1932 Land Reform Law gave preference to ‘collective cultivators’ for settlement on 
uncultivated land. Malefakis, 1970, p.229. 
70
 AIRA, Caja.6.24.  
71
 The association had 2,209 members and cultivated a number of farms. Letter dated 19 May 1934. 
AIRA, Caja 6.38.  
340 hectares and the second, possibly Catholic, syndicate, given 960 hectares for its 65 
members. The fact that Torremejía’s population was 1,200 suggests that a member in each 
agricultural household belonged to one or the other. On none of these three estates did the 
average plot exceed five hectares, but the associations argued that this type of policy helped 
alleviate local unemployment, and for the IRA it had the advantage that the settlers actually 
owned their own farm equipment.72 However, it also permitted some individuals access to land 
who otherwise would have failed to meet the selection criteria of the Censo de campesinos. 
Furthermore, the associations were now expected to follow rules imposed by the IRA, rather 
than their own informal norms on how farm operations were to be carried out and by whom, and 
their members were collectively responsible for all debts. 
In Badajoz, the number of settlers was almost double that which was initially 
recommended by the agronomists, either because land was rented to local associations, or 
because of the political demands to maximise numbers.73 The estimated net family income on 
each farm ranged from 145 on Ramira Alta to 3,029 on Represa, with an average of 1,315 
peasants (Table 5). Given that agronomists sometimes exaggerated the farm’s production 
potential, the real figures would be lower still. A combination of large families and small plots 
implied that workers were forced to seek off-farm employment making it hard to monitor their 
effort on the settlements, and leading to complaints about workers’ underperforming or simply 
disappearing.74 On Ramira Alta, 153 settlers were expelled for absenteeism, while another 53 
were fined for not working their plots adequately.75  
Except for the tenant associations, individual settlers were usually chosen from the 
nearest village according to a rough indicator of economic need, with the Catholic Acción Social 
selecting household heads with the greatest number of individuals over 12 years in their care 
from the Censo de campesinos. 76 This avoided any obvious political bias, but resulted in an 
average age of almost fifty (Table 6). In 1930 male illiteracy in Badajoz was 40 per cent, but 
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 The report for Merinillas Altas, speaks of the need to create ‘the greatest number of lots to maximise 
the number of beneficiaries and avoid discontent which would surely be produced by excluding large 
numbers of peasants from Valverde de Leganés.’ AIRA, Caja 6.59, plan de asentamiento de Merinillas 
Altas, p.v.  Settlers on Señorio y Taldarrobas already possessed work animals. AIRA, Caja 6.37. 
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 The figure is reduced to 14 per cent if Cabra Alta and Baja and Ramira Alta are excluded.  
74
  On La Pulgosa, for example, Román Pérez in December 1938 simply disappeared to looks after his 
sheep and goats, while Francisco Rodriguez wanted to leave to dedicate time to his own land. Other 
members also had abandoned their plots, but in these cases it was probably for political rather than 
economic reasons. AIRA, Caja 6-66. See also for Egido Nuevo (Caja 10.36) and divisions among settlers 
on Matadero (Caja 10.6). See also, (Carmona & Simpson, 2015a).  
75
 AIRA, Caja, 6.38. Following the tragic events after 18th July 1936, which saw Franco’s troops rapidly 
sweep across large areas of Extremadura, some workers fled the newly created settlements, and others 
were evicted or shot. In Badajoz in 1938, only 1,221 of the original 2,040 workers selected remained, 
with 350 having rejected the opportunity to join the farms, 145 ‘disappearing’, and 33 being expelled. 
76
 Some settlements also recruited specialist workers, such as shepherds to tend the village flock. The 
1932 Land Reform Act (Base 11) gave preference to cultivators with families, and within this category, 
those with most children. 
figures could vary significantly in neighbouring villages.77 There were also important 
differences between the new settlements, with no workers being able to sign their names on the 
Zarzoso estate, but 72 per cent on La Pulgosa.78 The fact that the numbers of those receiving 
land who could sign their names were sometimes higher than average village literacy, and that 
some settlers owned work animals, farm tools, or small plots of land, suggests that it was not 
always the poorest peasants who were selected.79  
 
 
Table 6.  Demographic features of the settlers of 6 asentamientos.   
  
households 
number 
average 
age of the 
household 
head 
total 
households 
members 
children 
older than 
14 years 
average 
per 
household 
settlers 
literacy 
rate 
male 
literacy in 
the same 
village 
Pulgosa, La  39 56 289 181 4,6 72 57 
Tablado y Capilla  17 42,6  16 0,9  
 
Zarzoso, El  14 50,2  36 2,6 0 17 
Naveperas  31 50,5 180 44 1,4 45 57 
Merinillas altas 1 61 51,4 388 83 1,4 41 69 
Quinto de Almadén 33 44,8 166 35 1,1 54 52 
       
 
Total 195 49,3   395 2,7     
Sources: Archivo del Instituto de Reforma Agraria: La Pulgosa, Caja 6.66; Tablado y Capilla, Caja 6.40; 
El Zarzoso, Caja 6.42 bis; Naveperas, Caja 6.36; Merinillas altas (1), Caja 6.59; Quinto de Almadén, 
Caja 6.38.  España. Dirección General del Instituto Geográfico, 1932. 
 
Table 7.  Estimated income per settler in Badajoz, 1935.   
  
cultivated 
area 
(hectares) 
projected 
total yearly 
income 
according to 
agronomists 
number of 
settlers 
cultivated 
area per 
settler 
(hectares) 
projected 
total income 
per settler 
(pesetas) 
NUMBER OF SETTLERS IN THE ORIGINAL PROJECT    
La Pulgosa 680 90.657 28 24,3 3.238 
Merinillas altas 596 279.155 23 25,9 12.137 
Las Cabras (Baja  and Alta) 2581 537.590 235 11,0 2.288 
Las Margaritas 430 66.124 32 13,4 2.066 
Zarzoso 193 37.595 14 13,8 2.685 
Señorío y Taldarrobas 2855 612.408 250 11,4 2.450 
Ramira Alta 982 166.012 560 1,8 296 
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 The gender gap was very large, and total illiteracy reached almost two-thirds for the province. (Instituto 
de Reforma Agraria, 1934), p.110.  
78
 Information is available for most settlements, but it is sometimes difficult to always be sure who was 
signing the documents. 
79
 In the case of La Pulgosa, not only could 72 per cent sign their name, but all had some work animals. 
AIRA, Caja 6.37. 
      
28 settlements total 12.904 n.a. 1.172 11,0 n.a. 
      
FINAL NUMBER OF SETTLERS (WHEN MODIFIED)    
La Pulgosa 680 90.657 39 17,4 2.325 
Merinillas altas 596 279.155 119 5,0 2.346 
Las Cabras (Baja and Alta) 2581 537.590 527 4,9 1.020 
      
28 settlements total 12.904 n.a. 1.941 6,6 n.a. 
Sources: AIRA: La Pulgosa, Caja 6.37; Merinilla Altas, Caja 6.59; Las Cabras, Caja 6.24; Las 
Margaritas, Caja 6.9; Zarzoso, Caja 6.42. 
 
Many agronomists and labour syndicates argued that it was preferable to maintain the 
estates and work them as collectives, suggesting that they believed there were some economies 
of scale. Settlers by contrast, perhaps aware of the potential difficulties of working in groups 
with an average of 81 families, preferred to work the land individually.80 The result was that a 
hybrid situation developed whereby each family cultivated their own plot on the open fields, but 
the organization of the village flock, the payment of rent, and the responsibility for repaying 
capital was a communal responsibility.81 The nature of agency problems and transaction costs 
were consequently changed rather than reduced, and the possibilities of increasing output 
through labour intensive improvements was limited to extending the area of subsistence cereals 
and collecting wood for charcoal production. 
In Badajoz the IRA advanced capital to at least 25 of the 29 settlements to purchase 
farm machinery, and to 22 to buy work animals, equivalent together to 37 per cent of the total, 
with the rest being used to purchase livestock, especially sheep and pigs.82 In addition, on all but 
two farms, the IRA advanced personal loans to settlers to feed their families and work animals, 
seed corn, fertilizers until the harvest, an important function that landowners had often 
previously performed (Table 8). Neither the state nor settlers had experience in managing credit 
operations, increasing the confusion already caused by the fact that the settlement solicited the 
loan, but responsibly for the debt was individual.83 As a result land reform, rather than creating a 
network of small independent family farms, simply changed workers’ dependence on private 
landowners for the IRA. The fact that the foreman kept daily accounts of the work carried out 
by each settler, reinforced the idea that they were wage labourers rather than independent 
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 Figures refer to Badajoz. AIRA, Caja 6.7. 
81
  It was believed that workers would sell the land if they were given full possession. Following the 1935 
Land Reform, the rent was paid to the old landowners. Sales were made collectively and any surplus 
distributed among settlers after rent and credit repayments had been made to the IRA.  This differed to the 
Intensificación de cultivos, where settlers were individually responsible for rental payments. As the old 
cadastral rents were always much lower, this helped inflate production and could therefore justify a 
greater number of settlers. 
82
 Calculated from AIRA, Caja 6.7. 
83
 For the Spanish government’s lack of experience with rural banks, see Carmona & Simpson, 2014b. 
farmers and in one case, in the province of Cadiz, workers actually went on strike for more 
pay.84 On the projected settlements, capital inputs remained low. 85 
 
Table 8.   Loans advances by the IRA to settlers (1934-1936) (in current pesetas) 
  institutional loans (1933-1936) 
 FIXED CAPITAL   WORKING CAPITAL  
  machinery livestock   
seeds and 
fertilizers 
to feed 
settlers 
to feed 
animals others total loans 
         
TOTAL 28 
SETTLEMENTS 160.110 829.702  390.752 450.422 319.514 176.997 2.327.497 
          % 6,9 35,6  16,8 19,4 13,7 7,6 100 
         
FOUR LARGEST LOANS         
Cabras, Las (Alta & Baja) 0 199.378  74.635 0 14.000 44.127 332.140 
          % 0 60,0  22,5 0,0 4,2 13,3 100,0 
Pulgosa, La 0 81.623  20.190 60.200 8.879 5.145 176.037 
          % 0,0 46,4  11,5 34,2 5,0 2,9 100,0 
Merinillas altas 20.808 17.843  40.901 38.700 23.864 4.708 146.824 
          % 14,2 12,2  27,9 26,4 16,3 3,2 100,0 
Margaritas 5.050 67.000  6.519 7.828 22.862 14.420 123.679 
          % 4,1 54,2  5,3 6,3 18,5 11,7 100,0 
         
per household (28 
settlements) 214 954  342 527 425 207 2.669 
maximum (Zarzoso) 80 2.750  368 619 1.110 570 5.497 
minimum (Ramira Alta) 0 71   56 33 3 3 166 
Sources: AIRA, Caja 6.7, Monografías de las 33 comunidades de Badajoz, 1938. See Appendix 2.   Señorio y 
Taldarrobas is excluded as it received none of the loans that it was granted in 1936. 
 
The theoretical literature suggests that a successful land reform increases output 
because family-run farms have good incentives to work quickly and diligently, both crucial 
factors in the time-constrained activities found in agriculture. However, economic development 
in Spain by the 1930s perhaps had reached a level where there was no longer a clear inverse-
relationship between farm size and land productivity, and capital requirements was becoming 
increasingly important.86 With cereals, it was not clear how significantly greater output could be 
obtained with higher labour inputs without using more capital, and the important economics of 
scale found on the latifundios is reflected in the recommendations of both agronomists and 
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 Macarro Vera, 2000, p.233. 
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 On Represa, Santisfolla or Merinillas, capital inputs were lower than 30 per cent of net output, 
compared to the 37 per cent used in the cadastral. 
86
 Lipton, 2009, p.65. The relationship still existed with specialised tree crops and irrigation, but not with 
cereals and extensive livestock farming. See Simpson & Carmona, in preparation. 
syndicates to maintain the organizational structure on the confiscated estates. Intensive livestock 
farming was also theoretically possible on marginal cereal land and dehesas, but this required 
costly feed-inputs, as well as higher farm prices and a significantly better marketing 
organization if it was to be profitable. 
The dehesas provided pasture for large numbers of animals during the winter months, 
that traditionally were rented, and some enjoyed a substantial income from cork. However, in 
both cases significant difficulties existed if the new settlements were going to integrate these 
activities within the community to reduce the levels of underemployed among their workers, 
rather than sub-contracting them to third parties, the preferred option of the IRA because of the 
greater security of payment.87 The poor soils found on many dehesas implied that labour-
intensive cereals were never going to significantly increase living standards, and cereal and 
legume production on the settlements were often small scale, and sufficient for little more than 
household needs.88  
Spain by the 1930s was perhaps too rich for a ‘classic’ land reform, and while the 
settling of large numbers of asset-poor workers redistributed incomes, it failed to increase either 
land or labour productivity. Land reform might have had a better chance of success if 
independent farms had been created with an annual turnover of around 7,500 pesetas as 
suggested by the IRA, but perhaps only a third of the poor would have benefitted, making the 
project not just excessively expensive but also politically unacceptable to those that were 
excluded. Instead, limiting reform to providing emergency relief for landless workers for one or 
two years, increased output in the short run, but ran the risk of exhausting soil fertility and the 
basis for future growth.   
 
4. Conclusion: why land reform fails in Spain? 
 
Land reform often has to try to meet two important, but often contradictory criteria, namely 
the alleviation of rural poverty by maximizing employment opportunities for workers, and 
increasing farm output and efficiency. Difficulties arise because the poorest member of rural 
society are often those least prepared to become rural entrepreneurs or participate in collectives 
given their lack of financial resources, poor physical condition, and illiteracy. Land reform in 
Spain failed not because the government necessarily lacked the will to carry it through or 
because of budgetary restrictions, but because there was insufficient uncultivated land available. 
Even if a third of all land had changed hands, there would have been insufficient for more than 
basic subsistence, even with significant help from the state, and workers remained dependent on 
off-farm work.   
                                               
87
 Therefore on La Pulgosa, the harvesting of cork, a skilled task, continued to be carried out by outsiders. 
Carmona & Simpson, 2015a. 
88
 See Carmona & Simpson, in preparation.  
The historical literature on the Spanish land reform has often been highly critical of the 
Azaña government, as very little land was expropriated and settled, but workers’ expectations 
and political tensions increased significantly. The government produced no feasibility studies 
for reform and, with the notable exception of the partly completed cadastre, had no farm-level 
information. This makes the information collected by the IRA exceptional to understand both 
the actual state of cultivation on the large estates before reform, and the potential to increase it 
after. On many of the large estates, cultivation in the 1930s was not abandoned as 
contemporaries often believed.  Today most historians prefer Díaz del Moral’s description in 
1928 of rapid progress taking place in Andalucia to Pascual Carrión’s criticism.89 Change was 
perhaps slower on Extremadura’s dehesas, but the IRA still faced the problem of having to 
settle asset-poor peasants on farms which were increasingly being run as capital intensive 
enterprises. Local workers were fully aware of these restrictions and to the limits of land reform, 
and this influenced how they responded to the possibilities created by the Second Republic and 
the new political power enjoyed by their syndicates. The slowness of reform, and the inability of 
workers’ associations to influence the selection process of workers to be settled, provided 
syndicates with opportunities to recruit across the region, and culminated in widespread land 
invasions in 1936.90  
  
                                               
89
 Díaz del Moral was the Socialist notary from Bujalance (Cordoba), and in his classic work on rural 
protest wrote that ‘El progreso agrícola, desde principios del siglo, ha sido enorme; el empleo de los 
abonos químicos y de la moderna maquinaría se ha difundido por todos los pueblos; algunas 
explotaciones se llevan, en cuanto a maquinaria al menos, con todo los adelantos de los países más 
progresivos; la producción de cereales y leguminosas se ha duplicado en los últimos veinte años’. Díaz 
del Moral, 1928: 1973, p. 37.  
90See Carmona & Simpson, 2015b and for land invasions see especially, Espinosa, 2007. 
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 APPENDIX 1.  
Estimate of the impact on incomes of transfers of all lands paying more than 5,000 pesetas tax 
  Badajoz Extremadura Southern Spain 
1. Agricultural families 128,557 206,338    1,145,362 
2. Output (‘000s ptas) 274,278 450,821    2,544,039 
3. Ricardian rent (33% output) ‘000 91,426 150,274 839,533 
4. %  rent to landowners > 5.000 ptas 60 58 40 
 5.    total rent to landowners > 5.000 55,13 88,791 335,813 
6. nett income per family without 
redistribution (ptas) 
1,705 1,755 1,922 
7. nett income per family with 
redistribution (ptas) 
2,134 2,185 2,221 
       % increase 25% 25% 16% 
Sources: Our calculations from Carrión, 1932: 1975 and Simpson, 1995b. 
APENDIX 2 
              institutional loans (1933-1936) 
      
number of 
settlers 
  fixed capital working capital   
settlement location 
distance 
from the 
village 
(in kms) 
area 
(in 
has.) 
cultivate
d area (in 
has.) 
cadastral 
asessmen
t (ptas.) 
propose
d 
fina
l 
cultivated 
area/settle
r (in has.) 
cadastral 
assessment 
per settler 
(in ptas) 
machiner
y animals 
seeds 
and 
fertilizer
s settlers fodder  others 
total 
loans 
Borrachinas, Las Alconchel 5 376 300 16.085 22 15 20,0 1072 4.425 22.259 11.526 16.200 17.015 4.097 75.522 
Cabras, Las (Alta y Baja) Zahinos 8 2.704 2.600 107.000 235 527 4,9 203 0 199.378 74.635 0 14.000 44.127 332.140 
Castillo de Guadajira Lobón 5 462 400 118.389 65 58 6,9 2041 2.110 6.224 1.867 10.708 3.305 1.324 25.538 
Cerrollano Villanueva del Fresno 8 727 707 40.808 45 65 10,9 628 12.525 24.203 19.497 3.000 27.444 14.696 101.365 
Cuncos Villanueva del Fresno 1 250 250 12.479 11 11 22,7 1134 3.420 14.812 4.992 5.850 7.773 10.497 47.344 
Dehesilla, La 
Santo Domingo 
(Olivenza) 3 353 320 17.654 16 8 40,0 2207 846 18.892 3.980 0 3.308 973 27.999 
Frada, La Valverde de Leganés 6 41 40 2.317 7 7 5,7 331 2.079 2.100 2.105 3.500 2.222 4.800 16.806 
Fresnillo y Pinel Montijo 3 393 393 46.955 58 58 6,8 810 10.900 0 19.004 37.691 14.477 0 82.072 
Fuente Omendo Valverde de Leganés 3 309 256 18.512 32 32 8,0 579 8.757 13.510 12.755 18.007 9.082 5.413 67.524 
Guaperal Roca de la Sierra 2 279 279 8.737 20 20 14,0 437 7.300 21.460 5.887 16.690 8.562 940 60.839 
Lapas y Risquillos Villanueva del Fresno 9 493 460 26.100 45 45 10,2 580 8.737 17.313 14.123 23.169 11.663 5.007 80.012 
Magistrada Olivenza 8 103 64 3.232 3 3 21,3 1077 2.199 2.837 596 751 826 0 7.209 
Margaritas Valle de Santa Ana 0,5 500 200 26.675 32 32 6,3 834 5.050 67.000 6.519 7.828 22.862 14.420 123.679 
Mata, La Fuente de Cantos 3 430 430 21.179 19 19 22,6 1115 3.979 17.711 10.647 15.450 7.728 1.580 57.095 
Merinillas altas Valverde de Leganés 2 596 596 29.798 119 119 5,0 250 20.808 17.843 40.901 38.700 23.864 4.708 146.824 
Monte Encinar de Villalba Villalba de los Barros 4 435 435 29.110 24 24 18,1 1213 12.690 27.425 11.117 26.495 26.325 18.230 122.282 
Naveperas Villanueva del Fresno 7 662 420 21.604 27 27 15,6 800 5.619 39.000 7.975 20.972 9.830 13.020 96.416 
Palacito Roca de la Sierra 2,5 254 154 14.712 22 22 7,0 669 5.600 21.300 6.731 4.400 8.537 1.763 48.331 
Pedazo, El Villar de Rey 6 316 316 17.000 23 23 13,7 739 2.443 30.125 4.178 17.530 14.467 1.372 70.115 
Pulgosa, La Barcarrota 5 892 680 56.622 28 39 17,4 1452 0 81.623 20.190 60.200 8.879 5.145 176.037 
Quinto de Almadén Alange 7 437 407 19.341 33 33 12,3 586 16.735 16.100 11.547 11.880 18.694 8.262 83.218 
Ramira Alta Higuera de Vargas 8 1.004 1.004 35.603 71 560 1,8 64 0 40.000 31.219 18.325 1.477 1.680 92.701 
Represa Villanueva del Fresno 5 629 629 21.860 78 70 9,0 312 0 0 21.299 36.655 0 476 58.430 
Santisfolla de la Rueda Montijo 6 135 94 9.758 23 23 4,1 424 3.728 4.024 8.169 9.608 4.884 285 30.698 
Señorío y Taldarrobas * Torremejías 0 2.855 1.776 87.143 250 250 4,1 424 38.070 45.000 29.689 80.809 29.000 
131.79
3 354.361 
Tablado y Capilla Jerez de los Caballeros  490 445 28.790 17 17 26,2 1694 2.744 41.659 6.281 13.375 13.826 259 78.144 
Tocinillos, Los Fregenal de la Sierra 14 285 180 15.600 29 16 11,3 975 3.600 14.525 7.876 14.585 3.731 933 45.250 
Vadevesevilla del Monte/la 
Rasa Villanueva del Fresno 7 690 690 23.905 54 54 12,8 443 12.703 29.879 19.980 10.189 19.189 5.010 96.950 
Zarzoso, El Valle de Matamoros 7 262 155 25.806 14 14 11,1 1843 1.113 38.500 5.156 8.664 15.544 7.980 76.957 
* Loans were aproved but not received.                
Sources: AIRA, caja 6.7, Monografías.                 
 
